Is there a Solution to Iraq War?

I just went and saw the documentary “No End In Sight” about the war in Iraq and would recommend to anyone else, who is able, to go and see it. This film was well made and I was stunned at times of how poorly some decisions were made. However it ended rather ambiguously merely stating that things looked grim and offering little in way of suggestions as what to do next.

Thinking back to our 3 weeks in the Hansen program I realized we really didn’t talk about the use of force or war as a method of conflict-resolution, but indeed it is a tool of conflict-resolution and one that must always be considered. When trying to create a policy proposal for a suggested method of resolution all options must remain on the table even if one is to simply rule out methods of force as too costly or impractical in each instance.

As our program was focused on peaceful methods of conflict-resolution, which are largely preventative methods to conflict, we did not have the chance to review methods of conflict resolution during and particularly post-conflict. I know that particularly with my intended career path, and maybe with many of yours as well, these methods will be highly relevant.

As was seen with the war in Iraq, the decision to go to war is not always democratic, but its repercussions always are. Whether or not you like the concept of warfare as a tool for diplomacy, chances are you won’t have a say in whether or not to begin a war. But, as possible future governmental employees, we will likely have a say in how to end it. Considering this I began to question what I would do differently to resolve a war like Iraq once others had already decided to begin it.

The first step would be to undo those three fatal mistakes made by Paul Bremer (former administrator of the Iraqi Coalition Provisional Authority). One, immediately set-up an interim government. Following the end of combat operations, Iraq was left in limbo. Bremer decided he did not want an interim government immediately set-up, but at the same time martial law was ruled out. This left a void for authority and accountability and that’s when the looting began. The governmental ministries were ransacked (further complicating measures later when they were brought back), the national library was burned to the ground, and the national museum with some of the earliest artifacts known to man was emptied overnight. Some went even as far as to chip away at these concrete buildings just the pull out the steel re-bars inside. The complete lawlessness from the looting left the Iraqis feeling abandoned and humiliated.

Bremer’s second step was the de-Baathification of governmental employees. This step was like permanently banishing anyone affiliated with the Communist part in China from governmental employment. Many of these workers joined the Baath party just to get a job and overnight hundreds of thousands of professionals were left unemployed and the fragile remnants of the political system completely collapsed.

Bremer’s third and worst decision was to completely disband all branches of the Iraqi armed forces and police. In a matter of days, General Hughes had compiled a list of 127,000 Iraqi military officers willing and ready to assist the American forces in restabilizing Iraq. This list was ignored by Bremer, Walter Slocombe and the other officials in charge of the DoD, and everyone in the Iraqi Armed Forces were told to go home and not to come back. This left Iraq’s most skilled fighters (and their weapons) unemployed, humiliated, and looking for revenge.

Originally, it was this displaced force of veteran fighters that formed the backbone of the insurgency. Then, as personal ideals took a back-burner to need for a source of income, these fighters became mercenaries, offering their services to local militias in exchange for a monthly stipend.

The next step would be to immediately withdraw all security contractors from Iraq. The majority of the wars questionable killings have come at the hands of these largely untrained security guards with a license to kill. The damage they have caused to the U.S. image with Iraqi citizens is perhaps irreversible. These fatal flaws only succeeded in alienating (and really pissing off) both the professional elite and common Iraqis.

The main problem was with US leadership. Those in charge of decision-making in the war had little to no military experience. Bush and Cheney were notorious draft-dodgers and had no military experience (the Texas National Guard does not count), Slocombe and Bremer had no military experience whatsoever, and Rumsfeld (the chief architect of the war) had only a brief and limited stint in the armed services. The problem with this is they didn’t know how to interpret the current conditions on the ground (also partially because they remained in Washington D.C.) and they didn’t have an understanding of the past.

A better understanding of the past could have provided them with better answers to this quagmire, answers that the military had learned in past wars. In the 1930’s, the Marines wrote The Small Wars Manual, a compilation of tactics and wisdom learned through their years of fighting guerrilla warfare and other forms of insurgencies. Unfortunately, despite containing insightful and helpful information, this manual has been largely ignored. One lesson states that it is the duty of the military “to establish law and order by supporting or replacing the civil government,” not stand by and watch lawlessness and looting consume the country. Also, contrary to the initial approach of Shock and Awe, the manual calls for a minimum use of firepower, “with the minimum of troops, in fact, with nothing more than a demonstration of force if that is all that is necessary and reasonably sufficient.” Apart from maintaining peace through the status quo, the manual also calls for a proactive approach simultaneously by the State Department in close coordination with the military and understands that “peace and industry cannot be restored permanently without appropriate provisions for the economic welfare of the people,” so rendering the majority of the country unemployed by mass dismissals, as ordered by Bremer, is in fact not advisable.

The most notable flaw in the current war strategy is the complete lack of any elements from the Combined Action Program. CAP began in 1965 in Vietnam and was one of the few successes in the war. Each Combined Action platoon had a marine rifle squad under the command of a sergeant (and all members were chosen exclusively for their ability to work with the local population). These 12-15 marines were paired with a platoon from the South Vietnamese forces (about 30 local men). The marines provided military knowledge and the Vietnamese provide an intimate knowledge of local conditions and the two groups would be encouraged to bond by sharing the same sleeping quarters, eating the same food, and working the same patrol assignments. This combined force made up a CAP and were responsible for maintaining control of a village.

One of the dilemmas of the current war in Iraq is that forces constantly have to reconquer cities as they do not have enough troops to maintain a foothold in all the cities at once. Instituting a CAP system would allow the US to provide a presence in all cities at once with a minimal amount of troops and the support of the local military, and thus likely the local populace who can provide invaluable information. The number of soldiers in each CAP could be adjusted according to the specific priorities of each city and would receive air reinforcement from attack helicopters if they should find their selves over-run.

“The Village” by Francis J. West Jr. recounts one of these CAPs in action at Binh Nghia following a devastating attack in which six of the twelve marines were ambushed and killed. The six remaining marines presented with the option of being evacuated, stated “we couldn’t leave. What would we have said to the PFs (S.Vietnamese Force) after the way we pushed them to fight the Cong? We had to stay. There wasn’t one of us who wanted to leave.” The positive effect from such a mutual respect on public opinion should not be underestimated. Nor should the experience gained; the marines learned the area from the PF and the PF learned proper military tactics, each becoming more productive fighting units and able to spread their knowledge to other adolescent CAPs exponentially.

It took several years, but yesterday I saw an article which showed the first signs of CAP tactics within Iraq. It is being called the Anbar Model, which might seem to indicate a novel concept but it is actually just a primitive form of the same strategy employed by CAP in Vietnam. The Anbar Model combines US military forces side by side with local Sheiks and their Sunni clansmen against their mutual enemy, and also Sunni, Al-Qaeda forces. This movement was spearheaded by Sheik Abdul-Sattar Abu Risha, who was subsequently killed by an IED attack that Al-Qaeda has claimed responsibility for. Rather than crippling the movement, the attack has created a martyr out of Abu Risha and reports are now stating that the Anbar Model has spread to the Shiite south where Sheik Majid Tahir al-Magsousi is providing his Shiite clansmen to receive training by the US forces and to work in conjunction with them to help patrol the Iranian border and bolster local security against Shiite militias. These elements clearly draw their roots from the aforementioned Combined Action Program; however there is one important element which has adapted specifically for the conditions of Iraq. The Sunni clansmen are only being used to fight fellow Sunnis and the Shiites other Shiites, as to prevent stoking further ethnic tensions between the two groups. If there remains any hope for Iraq it lies with the support and expansion of such programs country-wide.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3MdU09oD-OU
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070916/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_shiite_sheiks

DAVE (18 September 2007)
Ha-ha-ha, well I doubt it'd shock or surprise you that I'm against the bloody thing, but I initially was actually for it after Colin Powell helped Bush's media blitz in Oct-Dec 2002 enamored Americans of war once again.

I changed my mind, however, after the invasion shortly once I saw all my worst fears and predictions beginning to come true, not the least of which was suppressed evidence of transmitted/destoryed cold-war era WMD programs and quieted journalists on stories of the immediate failure of the country, esp. military on civilian atrocities, (i.e. the Haditha killings last year).

Where are these guys at today? Hard to say, it's such a chaotic environment it's hard from this perspective to see the Iraqis keeping their country together another year, much less to say in five. Most likely it'll be a quick, violent civil war in about a year after which the stabilizing effects of truncated war will cause the country to trifurcate into a confederalist arrangement with Baghdad as a nominal center of gvt., but rest assured the provinces will all be highly impassable as Shiitistan and Sunnistan will give way to regional war as Saudi, Syria and Iran arm all sides. Expect immensely high Sunnah civilian castualties as they're the smallest and poorest organized without a political arm to get them in line. As we see in Pakistan and Afghanistan, problems of ethnic, tribal, and intereligious violence remain at all-time highs are are a strong cause for future violence. Cause for these conflicts are many, but foremost amongst them is a resource-driven battle. As you know Iraq has one of the last large natural reserves of crude oil left in the world, the money to rebuild and rearm their country lies underneath their feet, it just takes stabilization and organization to reach down and get that black gold.

The big operating characters in the country are getting clearer as old alliances give way to new ones. The Badr Brigade is a serious force to deal with, and their current stance on the future of Iraq is uncertain. As Abu Risha, the top Sunni tribal leader (and a pretty scummy guy in his own right) got assassinated over last week, we see up close the cost of anyone in that region even -shaking- hands with President Dubya.

Al-Sadr's Mahdi Army is currently at low-level intensity as they use the Ramadan holiday gathering force in southern Iraq. Many of his forces indeed gain help from Iranian Shiite sympathisers but for the most part they operate in broad daylight, executing their own countrymen for violating their very narrow Salafist interpretation of Koranic law. This may be a function of their undoing, much like Hamas ruined their reputation for going after their own, Al Sadr's overconfidence may be his undoing.

Al Maliki is much stronger than the U.S. media gives him credit, and the sheer distrust of the man over here is baffling. He is the leader of the Iraqis, and our only way out. Without someone to blame, someone to praise, someone to look up to, the future of the political situation in the congress is impossible. Iraqis respect force, they like overconfidence, they like someone who'll rile things up when the time calls for it. They love that shit. Remember when they won the Asian Football conference two months ago? Felt good, huh? Iraqis dig that shit no mattter what. Let's hope in a few years they'll actually be able to come home and play officially for a standing crowd. Iraq needs leaders who can manipulate emotions that effectively. Right now, most of their politicians double as informants, illicit market operators, etc.. Necessity may invent the next Saddam, however, and a lot wish for the dictator's return from the grave.

Central Baghdad's a mess, even parts of Kurdistan are beginning to destabilize. Sunni militia in the center are redoubling their efforts for the oncoming war over Baghdad. The biggest situation right now is whether the U.S./Coalition forces are even going to function like yet another militia in an ever-scattered factionalized country. Pulling out now is impossible, it takes six months just to line up the troop carriers into the Gulf to get the boys and equipment out. The troops remain positive, but confused. Most don't spend time thinking about why they're over there (what soldier likes to think of such things when bullets and bombs loom overhead?), but most are coming back with less and less enthusiasm. The military right now is buying our troops off, paying them an extra year's pay to bring them back... though much of that money is promised to first-time recruits, but seldom delievered.

Indeed it looks like our forces are committed for the long-term, possibly with this thing winding down after one last big operation like in Korea. As you may remember in '52, U.S. forces were pulled back out of North Korea after the UN mandated a resolution to the situation (without convincing the generals on the ground!). We're looking at a familiar situation today, the U.S. will continue arming the Sunni insurgency to fight "Al Qaeda" (even though less than 10% of attacks in the last year on coalition forces were waged by known operatives for Al Qaeda. The vast majority are co-conspiracists and unemployed/able young Iraqis who're shit-tired of five years of occupation now. There are solutions, but they'll never take the hard way out, they always are going to take the quick and bloody way out if it guarantees keeping their families alive, etc..

In the U.S., the media campaign to stay in the country has faltered and swayed. President Bush has lost almost his entire cabinet of neo-khan supporters (Rummy, Rove, and now Gonzales are all out!), though this last week he had a mini-blitz over public consciousness as he, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, and General Petreus (sounds like a Roman general...) once again retread the reasons for going in, the reasons for staying, and the consequences if the U.S. drawdown. Cheney isn't leaving his side, and Americans are getting a taste for their blood. I would be surprised if the calls for their resignation or impeachment don't get louder next year as the really painful shit begins to sap our forces. As pundits in Washington proclaim Bush's "victory" over the anti-war left and congressional Democrats, the rest of the country isn't a bit impressed. Public dissatisfaction with his job performance is way down, though his general approval rate bumped up about 2% because of demonstration effects by the recent strength Petreus/Crocker report. Time has a way of forgetting, however, and I think the U.S. will, in fact, begin the draw down next year.

One last big thing this week, the Iraqi judiciary ordered that all activities by Blackwater LLC. be suspended from Iraq until the most recent killing of eight civilians by Blackwater PMC employees over the weekend is better investigated. As you know, Blackwater's a subsidiary of Cheney's Halliburton, originally as a weekend warrior sportsman's paradise in South Carolina, now it's the home to one of the fastest growing agencies in Iraq. Last year, they made over $800 million and have over 10,000 employees working on the ground as security forces, translators, and intel officers detatched to IA and coalition forces. Because the company exists in a legal grey zone depending on the topic their employees may or may not be subject to uniform military codes of justice, hence they can kill and get away with it. Well, it looks like someone has had enough and put an end to their business relationship. At the same time, Blackwater has immensely powerful friends in Washington, Baghdad and even Tel Aviv, as some of their officers get training from former Israeli and Chilean special forces. They've got the dough to spend to make the best mercenary army money can offer.

What will this do for the security situation? Well, if the reports I read were true (although never entirely -accurate-), this shows that the Iraqi government may find it's national calling by kicking out, removing the problem rather than solving it directly. It's shoddy, but it works. If the Iraqi government can successfully remove Blackwater, they'll be much closer to forcing the U.S. to capitulate and remove their forces quickly, much like the British just did in Basra as promised by Premier Gordon Brown. This is all highly contingent on the circumstances, and right now it looks like as much as the country can't physically withstand occupation (well over 90% blame the coalition as an "occupying force" rather than as a liberator of tyrrany). It makes sense that it would begin all now, as a confluence of events and extenuating coping mechanisms has been unleashed since Al Maliki's government began to collapse as chairs of regional-ethnic parties all reduced support in May.

This takes me to my final, darkest warning: Iran. Though I don't believe the U.S. is in a position where it can wage an effective, defensive ground war, we still have a -lot- of bombs waiting to get dropped on somebody. Probability that Americans will out-and-out revolt against government will grow much higher if they instate a draft, but domestic consequenes may grow higher even if a low-level arial war takes place. Take an air-war as a guarantee. If trends continue today with Petreus and other Pentagon officials widely blaming Iran as essential to arming and training Al Sadr's Mahdi Army, I believe the interaction is far more complex than they give credit. Indeed some Iranian sympathizers, specifically the Basij, the fundamentalist suicide brigades from the Iran-Iraq war, are more than common thinkers, they do indeed wish to see Iraq become a "glorious nation."

These people however have -nothing- to do with the nuclear ambitions of the country aside from voicing empty support to Ahmadinijad's regime (whom they blame for being too -secular-, amongst all things). Surely these mentally traumatized Iranian men who long for a distant glorious past to become their bloody future have better things on their hands besides bullying other moderate Iranians from violating narrow-minded Koranic public aesthetics codes, for they are hungry to serve any worthwhile purpose in the Iranian state again. Perhaps cooler heads will prevail, and perhaps E.U. will demonstrate much more obstinate leadership against Bush/Cheney's push towards yet a -fourth- front on the war on Terror, but I'm not holding my breath. Iran is much more sensitive to Europe's tithings and censures than they do the U.S.. That being said, I saw it coming five years ago that by now we'd be in the middle of not just Afghanistan, but toppling half the regimes of the mid-east.

I didn't see the new war in Somalia coming, but that was a much more tangential conflict to Iraq. Still unnerving if Ethiopia managed to get it to work out they way they want it, but for the most part everywhere the U.S. touches now turns to ash and shite and I don't see East Africa improving out of this.

Solution will have to involve bilateralism, multilateralism, or unilateralism. The unilateral solution is simple: wave and smile as our troops leave. No money is further given for reconstruction, chaos ensues, which will likely take 4-6 years to solve. Price of oil will skyrocket as Saudi and Iran get involved. This solution is unwinnable, but probable.

Bilateralism: we maintian friendly troops in harm's way for the indefinite future as a wildcard. Leave at least 100k troops in stations around the country or nearby in Qattar and Diego Rivera AFB. With the threat of new bombs overhead, assured destruction may be necessary to bind the Sunni and Shiites with direct threat of force. This solution lacks credibility and material implementation will proceed to become more difficult as costs will overrun effectiveness. The Pentagon doesn't like this solution as they want to save face and end what they think they can end. This solution is more probable.

Finally, multilateralism. Convince Syria, Jordan, Iran and Turkey to get involved in opening up to the country once it's reconstructed. Later bring in UN and EU as impartial arbiters for renegotiation of territorial boundaries. Currently the largest reconstruction firm in Iraq is actually a Turkish rebuilding company who also staffs translators for coalition and U.S. diplomatic detatchments. So there's some financial taste to this one, but it's going to take tremendous changes in foreign policy, domestic policy, and internal Iraqi policy. It's more of an end-game scenario, than a serious answer to the current instability in the country. Of course it's totally inconcievable under the current administration, so look to 2009 as the first year this is even possible.

CHUCK (18 September 2007)

Implied in you question is the assumption that there is a quick or easy fix for the problems in Iraq. That being said, it is imperative that the U.S. stay the course. A failed state would be a signal to Islamic terrorists that the United States can be defeated militarily if they can out last our efforts. Insurgency as a tactic is the acceptance on the part of those employing it of military inferiority. Those groups targeting US efforts right now understand that they are not going to be able to kill enough Americans to physically force the American out of Iraq. They can however kill one or two Americans at a time, which will slowly demoralize the American public (especially depending on how the media portrays our relative success or failure).

The U.S. needs to continue the transfer of political control and security responsibility to Iraqis. There needs to be some efforts towards a regional solution to the problems in country. This means getting the Iranians and to a less degree the Syrians to stop logistical support to their preferred factions within the country. The US also needs to make it clear that troops will remain in Iraq as long as necessary to accomplish the mission. A “deadline” for withdrawal (also know as “Benchmarks” to the democrats) is surrender.

Remember it is easy to rule and control a multi ethnic state if tyranny and terror are your methods it is much harder to create a heterogeneous state in which the rights of minorities are respected and there is a constitutional stability. Right now everyone sees a failed state in Iraq. Although there are problems they will work out.

Being trained as a historian I see many parallels between Bush and his policy of democratization in the middle east and Harry Truman and his policy of Containment at the beginning of the Cold War. Truman was very underrated as a president during his term in office. His support of the Republic of Korea in resisting the a Communist take over was described as a unwinable quagmire which was killing you Americans (33,000) with no end in sight. The Korean war cost Truman the presidency in 1952. However historians in the last 20 years now see the Korean war as a turning point in the Cold War and a definite victory (even though most observers at the time couldn’t see it). I think the same thing will happen with the war in Iraq once time passes.